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Abstract: In this paper, we focus on difference as a 
feature of political community, in Greek Ancient 
thought. There usually describes the Greek conception 
of polis as a community of equals. This is a very 
important legacy. However, this is not the same as to 
(misleadingly) state it as a homogeneous community 
(as Émile Durkhein does in De la division du travail social, 
1893). The tension between equality and diversity is a 
paramount political theme, and there is a lot to learn 
about this from Aristotle. His investigations on the 
nature of polis propose an original combination of 
equality and difference to ground human associations. 
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This is my point: how can we say that polis is, at 
the same time, an association of equal but different 
people? This is relevant for understanding justice as 
a central feature and task of political life. Although 
there is a lot elsewhere to consider, we explore this 
question from some selected arguments presented in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Book V), and Politics 
(Books I and II). Methodically, we try to understand 
every statement from its dialectical context of inquiry. 
This makes Topics a relevant background (or even a 
guide) to the approach we propose.
Keywords: Aristotle; Diversity; Equality; Justice; 
Politics.
Resumo: Neste artigo, focalizamos a “diferença” 
como uma característica da comunidade política, 
no pensamento grego antigo. Em geral, descreve-se 
a concepção grega de polis como uma comunidade 
de iguais. Este é um legado muito importante. Mas 
isso não é o mesmo que (erroneamente) declará-
la como uma comunidade homogênea. A tensão 
entre igualdade e diversidade é um tema político 
primordial, e há muito a aprender sobre isso com 
Aristóteles. Suas investigações sobre a natureza da 
polis propõem uma combinação original de igualdade 
e diferença para fundamentar as associações humanas. 
Este é o ponto neste trabalho: como podemos dizer 
que a polis é, ao mesmo tempo, uma associação de 
pessoas iguais mas diferentes? É relevante entender 
a justiça como uma característica central e tarefa da 
vida política. Embora haja muito mais em outros 
lugares a considerar, exploramos esta questão a partir 
de alguns argumentos selecionados apresentados 
no Livro V da Ética de Nicômaco e nos Livros I e II 
da Política.Metodicamente, tentamos entender cada 
afirmação dos textos interpretados a partir do seu 
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contexto dialético. Isso torna os Tópicos, também de 
Aristóteles, um pano de fundo relevante (ou mesmo 
um guia) para a abordagem que propomos. É por 
onde o texto começa.
Palavras-chave: Aristóteles; Diversidade; Igualdade; 
Justiça; Política.
METHODIC REMARKS3
Dialectic is the method Aristotle uses in most of his 
practical treatises, we assume. As he states in Topics, there 
are three uses for Dialectic, all of them strictly interconnected. 
It is useful as exercise for disputes and discussions, for 
conversations, and for philosophical sciences (Top. I, 2, 101 
a 26-28). Politics and Ethics are examples of its philosophical 
use.4
3 We have investigated different aspects of the subject in recent papers: 
“Politics and equality in Greek invention of democracy”, and “Controversy 
and practical reason in Aristotle”. The first version of this paper was 
delivered to Special Workshop “Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law: Justice 
and Society”, in the 26th World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social 
Philosophy of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social 
Philosophy (Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 
- IVR).
4 “For the study of the philosophical sciences it [Dialectic] is useful, because 
the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make 
us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise. 
It has a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used 
in the several sciences. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the 
principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles 
are the prius of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held on 
the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs 
properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic: for dialectic is a process of 
criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.” (Top. I, 2, 101 
a 34-36). There is a huge discussion about the use of Dialectic in Aristotle’s 
different works. Scholars dispute about its meaning, and different views 
on Dialectic lead to varying positions about its employment. About this, 
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The reader must be aware of it, or the texts may look 
a bit confusing and contradictory. Many times it is difficult 
to discern Aristotle’s own opinion among the multitude of 
voices he brings to discuss both sides of every theme.
Dialectic is a method to deal with controversy and 
dispute. Differently from scientific knowledge (episteme), the 
dialectical researcher does not have evident and necessary 
axiomata from which deduce conclusions. He must deal with 
contending reliable opinions (endoxa), and it is not clear, from 
the beginning, which ones of them are true – or even if any 
of them is true; dialectic is exactly the method to discern it, 
as far as possible.
In its primary use, dialectic is a technic to win 
face-to-face debates. These ones have a question-answer 
structure, and their goal is leading the opponent, through 
sequential questions, to accept the thesis adopted by the 
inquirer. This arrangement makes scientific and dialectical 
syllogisms quite different. Scientific syllogism is a display 
(ἀπόδειξις) of conclusions which follow grounding (ἀλήτων) 
principles (πρώτωι), “for in regard to the first principles 
of science it is improper to ask any further for the why 
and wherefore of them” (Top. I, 1, b 21-22). Scientist just 
has to state the premises, to ground the conclusion. For 
example: Men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Then, Socrates 
is mortal. The dialectician, instead, deduces from premises 
see Frede (2012), Salmierwe (2009) and Cooper (2009). We assume the term 
“Dialectic” in a very broad sense, as to mean all inquiring which starts from 
endoxa (opinions which are not evident but reliable, reputed but disputable) 
and which tries to understand something from exploring all kinds of 
problema and aporia (the contradicting opinions and arguments) which 
rises from them. we do not need to accept any compromise of Dialectic to 
the truth of common sense (as Aristotle does not use endoxa in order to just 
endorse them, indeed), and neither need to oppose Dialectic and Definition 
as two exclusionary ways of investigation (as defining is indeed a central 
procedure in dialectical efforts).
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that are not undeniable. In order to progressing with his 
“demonstration”, he must obtain the acceptance of the 
answerer first. Questioner’s conclusion can only be produced 
after his premises obtain accordance. Hence, his premises 
are questions. As an example:  Is life according to excellence 
good? (Yes.) Is ethical virtue an excellence? (Yes.) Then, life 
according to ethical virtue is good.
The dialectician learns to collect his premises from 
reputed opinions (endoxa), as this may increase their 
acceptance.5
Acceptance, however, may fail. When the answerer 
rejects the premise, it turns into a problem.6 If the question 
“is this X?” receives the answer “no”, this causes the rise of 
a problem: “is this X, or not?”7 Aporia is the difficulty the 
answerer puts to resist to interrogator’s argument. Before 
a problem (the answerer’s “no!”), the interrogator has to 
suspend his progress, until solving the difficulty. As the art 
of dialectic consists in overcoming this sort of difficulties, 
5  “A dialectical premiss is the asking of something acceptable to everyone, 
most people, or the wise (that is, either all of them, most of them, or the 
most famous), provided it is not contrary to opinion (for anyone would 
concede what the wise think, so long as it is not contrary to the opinions of 
the many).” (Top, I, 10, 104 a).
6  “A dialectical problem is a point of speculation, directed either to choice and 
avoidance or to truth and knowledge (either on its own or as working in 
conjunction with something else of this sort), about which people either have 
no opinion, or the public think the opposite of the wise, or the wise think 
the opposite of the public, or each of these groups has opposed opinions 
within itself.” (Top. I, 11, 104 b).
7  “A problem is different from a premiss in its form. For stated in this way: 
‘Is it the case that two-footed terrestrial animal is the definition of man?’ 
or, ‘Is it the case that animal is the genus of man?’ it is a premiss; but stated 
in this way: ‘Whether two-footed terrestrial animal is the definition of man 
or not’, it becomes a problem (and similarly in other cases). Consequently, 
it stands to reason that problems and premisses are equal in number, since 
you may make a problem out of any premiss by changing its form.” (Top. I, 
4, 101 b).
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we may say that problems are the starting point of every 
dialectical inquirer.
The technic to solve aporiai basically involves the usage 
of common places (topoi).  These are arguments with high 
probability to be accepted by any discusser, thus useful to 
decide between the alternatives opened by problems.
The philosophical use Aristotle himself makes of 
dialectic in Politics reveals the adapted employment of endoxa 
as dialectical premises, their conversion into problems, 
and the use of topoi as tools to decide among conflicting 
possibilities.
Of course there is no question-answer structure, 
as Aristotle didn’t write dialogues but treatises. But he 
systematically brings to discussion reputed opinions to start 
investigation. Endoxa are brought to face other ones, and the 
thesis of Aristotle himself. He crosses these aporiai using topoi 
he describes in Topics, and all this helps him to take stand 
on the matter.
Next we recall some arguments from EN V and Politics 
I and II about the nature of polis, considering them as parts of 
dialectical investigations. It means trying to understand them 
as efforts at solving problems, in the context of struggling 
opinions, with the aid of topoi.
The Books we selected start from sound statements 
about the method. Aristotle plainly wants us to be warned 
about their dialectical arrangement. Let us see what happens.
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DEVELOPMENT
Defining the political
A major task of Politics is to understand polis and the 
political.8
Having knowledge of something is being able to define 
it. Aristotle clarifies polis by distinguishing it from other 
kinds of association or community (κοινωνία).
All associations seek a certain good: this is a feature 
of the genus “κοινωνία”9, which must mark every species 
which belongs to it.10 The different kinds of κοινωνία differ 
accordingly to the kinds of good they seek. The hierarchy 
among the ends of the associations establishes the hierarchy 
among the associations themselves: the end of polis is the 
most supreme (κυριωτάτη), thus polis is the most supreme 
association.11 This is the first (although brief) move to 
differentiate polis from the other types of human association.12
8  This is a common inaugural concern. Ethics starts from this kind of subject’s 
clarification, as well as Rhetoric and Topics…
9  The teleological emphasis of Politics recalls once again the beginning 
of Ethics. Both open investigations by stating that the end is capital do 
understand the genus within which the subject of study will be framed: 
action among (always teleological) human activities, in Nicomachean Ethics; 
political association among (always teleological) human associations, in 
Politics.
10  “(…) for of all the elements of the definition the genus is usually supposed 
to be the principal mark of the essence of what is defined” (Top. VI, 1, 139 a 
29-31).
11  The argument reminds some topoi presented at Top. III, 1: “In general, too, 
a means directed towards the end of life is more desirable than a means to 
anything else  (…) of two productive agents that one is more desirable whose 
end is better (…) For what produces happiness exceeds what produces health 
just as much as happiness exceeds health. “
12  “The classes, then, of things about which, and of things out of which, 
arguments are constructed, are to be distinguished in the way we have said 
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Aristotle dialectically organizes the subject from the 
problematization of the reputed opinion (ἔνδοξος) according 
to which political, royal, despotic and familiar ruling 
(πολιτικός, βασιλικός, δεσποτικός and οἰκονομικός) are “the 
same”.13 The choice of the platonic opinion for the beginning 
of the inquiry is not casual. Besides being hold by an esteemed 
philosopher, it allows Aristotle to explore essential aspects of 
political community. The demonstration of the peculiarity of 
the political occupies most of his argumentation in Politics.
The opinion questioned identifies political community 
to other forms of community. The problem is to know if 
πολιτικός, βασιλικός, δεσποτικός and οἰκονομικός are the 
same  (εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν), or if they differ (διαφέρειν) (Pol. 
1.1252a 5-10).14
Aristotle stands firmly against the identification:
Those then who think that the natures of the statesman, the royal 
ruler, the head of an estate and the master of a family are the same, 
are mistaken. (Pol. 1.1252a)
According to Top., I, 7, an important part of dialectician’s 
work is to distinguish the meaning of “the same”, which can 
be said in three different ways: in number (the same thing), 
before. The means whereby we are to become well supplied with reasonings 
are four: (1) the securing of propositions; (2) the power to distinguish in 
how many senses particular expression is used; (3) the discovery of the 
differences of things; (4) the investigation of likeness.” (Top. 105 a 20-25.)
13  The opinion under attack is platonic. The same problem is proposed at 
Stateman, 258e: “Shall we then assume that the statesman, king, master, and 
householder too, for that matter, are all one, to be grouped under one title, 
or shall we say that there are as many arts as names?” Plato concludes they 
are the same as they hold the same knowledge. It is interesting to observe 
that this topos, according to which something is the same as far as falls under 
a same science, is employed by Aristotle in Politics I as well.
14  Top. I, 5, 102a 7-9 : “in connection with definitions, the better part of our 
time is taken up with whether things are the same or different.”
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in species (the same εἶδος), or in genus (the same γένος15):
First of all, we must determine the number of ways that ‘same’ is 
used. We may regard the same as being divided, in outline, into 
three parts, for we are accustomed to describe what is the same 
as ‘in number’ or ‘in species’ or ‘in genus’. (Top., I, 7)16
In which sense can be πολιτικός, βασιλικός, δεσποτικός 
and οἰκονομικός said as the same? According to Plato, they 
seem to belong to the same species (or even to be the same 
person). Aristotle disagrees: he thinks they are identical only 
in genus, but are different in kind.
Plato fails because he thinks that the difference between 
the political and the other types of κοινωνία is not essential, 
but merely of number of the people who obey or rule.
(…) they [the Academics] imagine that the difference between 
these various forms of authority is one of greater and smaller 
numbers, not a difference in kind. (Pol. 1.1252a)
Hence, Aristotle puts the genus-component at the 
dialectical stage: κοινωνία. “Since a definition is composed 
of a genus and differentiae” (Top. I, 8, 103 b), he must next 
uncover the peculiar features of the political, to discern its 
specificity. 
15  “A ‘genus’ is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of 
things exhibiting differences in kind.” (Top. 102 a 31-32).
16  “Those are the same in number which have several names though there 
is one thing, for example a cloak and a coat. Those are the same in species 
which, though many, are indistinguishable with respect to species, for 
instance as a human (is the same in species) as a human or a horse the 
same as a horse (for those things are said to be the same in species which 
fall under the same species). Similarly, those are the same in genus which 
fall under the same genus (as a horse (is the same in genus) as a human).” 
(Top. I, 7).
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General strategy to find the eídos of polis
Aristotle faces the task of finding the specificity of 
polis among the different kinds of human communities “in 
accordance with our [his] regular method of investigation”. 
That means “to analyze the composite whole down to its 
uncompounded elements (for these are the smallest parts 
of the whole)” (Pol. I, 1. 2-5). This analytic method guides 
him to find the essential difference he seeks. He studies 
the human associations from the simple (not composite: 
ἀσύνθετος) elements they come from. This method implies 
understand things as they develop (φύω, verb from which 
φύσις – nature – originates) from the beginning (or “from 
the principle”: ἐξ ἀρχῆς). That means: the way they are by 
nature (φύσει).
Polis, the broadest whole (ὅλος; παντός), is analyzed 
in progressive smaller parts (μέρος; μόριον). It embraces 
the village (κώμη), which embraces the household (οἰκία), 
which embraces different kinds of familiar relations (master 
and slaves; husband and wife; and father and children). The 
simplest part is “each one of us” (ἕκαστος ἡμῶν), the human 
being (ἄνθρωπος) (Pol. 1.1253a).
His twofold strategy involves understanding 
the constitutive elements of the community, and the 
“development process from the principle” (nature) which 
is responsible for being polis the way it is. The two paths 
are the same, because the principle from which associations 
develop rests on the simple (decompounded) parts. 
Communities germinate from human necessities
Understanding how things develop from their principle 
(that means, by nature) requires investigating the inner 
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necessity which pushes things to be what they are. The 
various types of association arise from different types of 
necessity. This is central in Aristotle’s differentiation of polis.
Household answers to daily needs. Villages aim at 
more than simply surviving, but at ease. Poleis aim at more 
than comfortable life: they seek the good life (εὐδαιμονία). 
In this sense, polis is the specifically human association, and 
thus the human being is, by nature, a political animal (ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον).
The principle from which (ἐξ ἀρχῆς) any association 
develops (φύω) is  human needy condition. Anyone partakes 
any association as far as foresees some good for himself – i.e., 
because membership answers to some desire. It is one and the 
same investigation: about nature of association/community, 
about the necessity which pushes one to associate, and about 
the good aimed by its members. 
It is necessary to discover the principle (the human 
need and thus the anticipated good which inflames desire) 
to which each association responds, in order to discover 
its essence and to distinguish its species. Self-sufficing 
(αὐτάρκεια) is the general goal of every association (as each 
one is not self-sufficient if he keeps apart: εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης 
ἕκαστος χωρισθείς).17
Necessity (ἀνάγκη) of descendants is the principle that 
pushes male and female to the most basic form of association. 
There is nothing specifically human in this: the same impulse 
17  In the investigation on the “development from the beginning” (nature), the 
ἀρχῆ is the end (τέλος). Aristotle’s inquiry about nature is quite different 
from Moderns: we are especially concerned about causes, while Aristotle 
talks about ends. It is no absurd to think about necessity as the principle 
from which associations arise. All associations aim at some good and thus 
to the satisfaction of some human necessity, to the fulfillment of same lack: 
of a need. Accepting necessity as the principle from which the associations 
arise is as the same as stating that associations aim at some good.
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is found even in plants. It is not anything we can choose 
(οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως), for we are thrown (ἐφίεσθαι) to this 
by nature (φυσικὸν). Necessity (the need of security) also 
grounds the natural union between the “natural ruler“ (the 
“natural master”: δεσπόζω φύσει) and the “natural subject” 
(the “natural slave”).
Regarding to its specific end, polis differs for it aims at 
the complete human satisfaction. Poleis come into existence 
not just for the sake of life, but for the good life (εὖ ζῆν). 
Partaking in the polis is the source (γενέσεως) of human 
accomplishment (τελεσθείσης). This way, Aristotle elucidates 
how polis develops according to its principle: it answers to 
the need (δεόμενος) of αὐτάρκεια.
Being self-sufficient and independent (αὐτάρκης) is the 
end of human being, but he needs to associate to accomplish 
it. Necessity marks humanity.  Neither the beast (which does 
not desire it) nor the god (who is αὐτάρκης already) has the 
human nature.
In polis, participate those (human beings) who need 
(δέω) it to reach αὐτάρκεια. Each one apart (ἕκαστος χωρισθείς) 
does not suffice, and this way nature pushes us to political 
community. From this principle, there develops (φύσει) the 
impulse (ὁρμὴ) to political association.
All communities are hierarchical
There is a natural difference among the participants 
in the basic (familiar) forms of κοινωνία, which is decisive 
to their formation. Difference makes association useful for 
male and female, master and slave, father and children.18
18  The different kinds of community aim at the benefit of all associates. 
Aristotle must sustain it, or the association would lose its teleological feature: 
to aim at the good of the participants. To keep this valid, Aristotle develops 
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It introduces hierarchy as an essential feature of every 
association. Every association is a sort of domination.
In every composite being, there is a part that rules, and 
another that obeys.19 That also happens to human as a body-
soul composite, each part destined by nature to rule (mind) or 
to be ruled (body). The same is right for human associations, 
within which one part naturally tends to command, other 
ones to obey: male over female and children, master over 
slaves. Associations ground on inequality, and in spite of this 
(or just because of this, we should say) it is better (βελτίων) 
and profitable (συμφέρει) for everybody to keep associated. 
Thus, hierarchy integrates the explication about how 
associations are brought into existence according to their 
principle (by nature).
These arguments sound disgusting to contemporary 
readers. But that (the natural supremacy of some over others) 
is not the thesis Aristotle wants to demonstrate in Politics I. 
His point is discovering the specificity of the political; the 
exposition of associations among non-equal human beings 
helps exactly to put, at the dialectical stage, the other of the 
political.20 As it is broadly known, according to Aristotle polis 
is the association of equal men: “Republican government 
the arguments about natural slavery. we can’t focus on this important 
dialectical problem. Aristotle recalls opinions to strongly state the artificial 
(not by nature, but merely conventional, and bias-based) character of slavery. 
Aristotle admits that this discussion keeps open while he writes (“even 
among the learned some hold this view, though others hold the other”), but 
his conclusion is clear: enslavement of “natural slaves” is fair…
19  “in every composite thing, where a plurality of parts, whether continuous 
or discrete, is combined to make a single common whole, there is always 
found a ruling and a subject factor, and this characteristic of living things is 
present in them as an outcome of the whole of nature, since even in things 
that do not partake of life there is a ruling principle, as in the case of a 
musical scale.” (Pol. 1.1254a)
20  This is the dialectical achievement he believes to get, from the argumentation 
about slavery: “And even from these considerations it is clear that the 
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controls men who are by nature free, the master’s authority 
men who are by nature slaves” (Pol. 1.1255b).21
At the beginning of this study, we proposed the 
question: how can polis be, at the same time, an association 
of equal but different people?
The elements we brought seem to increase the 
difficulty. We have seen that the difference of the parts 
of an association generates domination and hierarchy. As 
domination and hierarchy also marks polis, can it nevertheless 
be an association of equal man?
The way Aristotle solves this difficulty is part of his 
effort to differentiate the political from other species of 
κοινωνία. By nature, there are two differences to distinguish 
polis: the end it aims at; and the kind of hierarchy it establishes. 
Before focusing more accurately on this, we need to 
add another ingredient to understand polis.
Polis as association of exchange among different 
people
Politics I carefully describes the fulfillment of material 
human necessities.  It belongs to the strategy of studying polis 
as emerging from its principle (φύσει). The considerations on 
property and acquisition of supplies are important to grasp 
the passage from the household to village, and so to polis. 
In household goods are produced, shared and consumed 
by the associated members themselves. Villages come into 
authority of a master over slaves is not the same as the authority of a 
magistrate in a republic, nor are all forms of government the same, as some 
assert.” (Pol. 1.1255b)
21  It is a dialectical resource often used, to understand human affairs, to 
study something from its opposite. It is that Aristotle does here, trying to 
understand the political association from the non-political associations.
NUNO M. M. S. COELHO E CLEYSON DE MORAES MELLO 93
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 114 | pp. 79-103 | jan./jun. 2017
existence with the uprising of barter of household supplies. 
But there isn’t money yet, whose outbreak distinguishes 
political associations.
With money, “came into existence the other form 
of wealth-getting”, trade”. Nicomachean Ethics V-5 details 
polis as a system of trade, and the role of money in it. The 
goal, there, is differentiating justice from retaliation, and 
specifying justice as a kind of proportionality.
Difference is remarked as condition to every exchange:
For an association for interchange of services is not formed be-
tween two physicians, but between a physician and a farmer, and 
generally between persons who are different, and who may be 
unequal, though in that case they have to be equalized. (EN, V, 5).
The difference among the members of the exchange 
community reflects in the price of the goods or services they 
offer.
It [money] is a measure of all things, and so of their superior or 
inferior value, that is to say, how many shoes are equivalent to a 
house or to a given quantity of food. As therefore a builder is to 
a shoemaker, so must such and such a number of shoes be to a 
house, [or to a given quantity of food] (EN, V, 5).
As the “measure of all things”, money makes 
exchanging possible, and subsequently it is necessary to the 
existence of association at this level (polis). Money assures 
the commensurability between the exchanging goods, and 
thus the exchange itself.
If there were no exchange there would be no association, and there 
can be no exchange without equality, and no equality without 
commensurability. (EN, V, 5).
There is no polis without trade – and no trade is 
necessary except between different people (who offer and 
need different things). Money is exactly necessary to turn 
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possible trade as an association among different people.
It works as a sign of necessity. Once again, Aristotle 
notes that association springs from human defectiveness. It is 
need (χρεία) that makes people associate (συνέχει). As need 
is reciprocal (ἀλλήλων), people associate. Necessity keeps 
everything together (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἡ χρεία, ἣ 
πάντα συνέχει) (EN, V, 5, 1133a)
But not need alone does so: both need and diversity 
produce association. Diversity, non-auto-sufficiency and 
necessity roots polis (the shoemaker and the builder needs 
each other exactly because one of them is not able to build 
houses he needs, and the other, the shoes).
Diversity and polis
Politics II reaffirms the “nature strategy”, and 
problematizes another Platonic opinion (must the citizens 
own everything in common, including women and 
children?). Once again, disagreement helps Aristotle to 
show an essential feature of polis. This turn, he attacks the 
Academic “ideal of the fullest possible unity of the entire 
state, which Socrates takes as his fundamental principle” 
(Pol. II, 1, 1261 a 15-17).
Yet it is clear that if the process of unification advances beyond a 
certain point, the city will not be a city at all for a state essentially 
consists of a multitude of persons (πλῆθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν 
ἡ πόλις), and if its unification is carried beyond a certain point, 
city will be reduced to family and family to individual. (Pol. II, 
1, 1261 a 17-20)
Every association grounds on diversity of its members, 
in progressive intensities. Polis has the higher grade of 
diversity among associations. He underlines the diversity 
which marks polis as essential:
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And not only does a city consist of a multitude of 
human beings, it consists of human beings differing 
in kind. (Pol. II, 1, 1261 a 24-25)
Polis doesn’t develop from the union of similar (οὐ γὰρ 
γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων), homogeneous people.
Instead of increase it, exaggerated homogeneity may 
destroy polis.
Yet it is clear that if the process of unification advances beyond a 
certain point, the city will not be a city at all for a state essentially 
consists of a multitude of persons, and if its unification is carried 
beyond a certain point, city will be reduced to family and family 
to individual, [20] for we should pronounce the family to be a 
more complete unity than the city, and the single person than the 
family; so that even if any lawgiver were able to unify the state, 
he must not do so, for he will destroy it in the process. (Pol. II, 1, 
1261 a 24-25)
How can we say that polis is, at the same time, an 
association of equal but different people? (Ques-
tion 1)
Turning back to our question: how can we say that 
polis is, at the same time, an association of equal but different 
people?
At this point, we have elements enough to suspect that 
this is a false problem.
In a kind of sophistical argument22, the question we 
proposed uses the same words to signify different things. It 
suggests that polis is an association of equal and not equal 
participants. In Aristotelian terms, notwithstanding, it could 
never be formulated this way.
22 One of the strategies Aristotle teaches against sophistry is exactly the art 
of demolishing cheating (false) homonymies.
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It is clear the difference between the use of “equal (and 
unequal)” and “homogeneous (and heterogeneous)”. The 
distinction between equal and unequal generally occurs 
in contexts where there is hierarchy, when it assesses the 
relative positions of the parts in a community, to conclude 
on whether there is superiority or inferiority. These aspects 
are generally not involved in the use of homogeneous 
and heterogeneous. Talking about equality and inequality 
involves comparing parts in a hierarchical structure, asking 
who rules and who is ruled.
For Aristotle, polis is an association among ἕτεροι 
(heterogeneous) and ἶσοι (equal) components, and 
there is no contradiction in this. Citizens are ἕτεροι (or 
ἀνόμοιοι) (diverse, different) for they are not identical: they 
have different characters, needs, jobs, competences and 
perspectives about life – which push them to associate to 
each other, in their seek for completeness.
But they are ἶσοι (equal) in the sense that there is no one 
who is able to naturally rule over any one of them.
Human associations differ according to their grades of 
heterogeneity and equality. Household relations are more 
homogeneous than polis, but much less egalitarian.23
In any case, every association grounds on diversity. 
Slaves benefit from association with their master because it 
redresses their inability to deliberate. Man and woman are 
incapable of reproducing one without the other... Woman, 
slaves and children benefit from the full deliberative capacity 
of the free adult man.
23  (…) “a state essentially consists of a multitude of persons, and if its 
unification is carried beyond a certain point, city will be reduced to family 
and family to individual, for we should pronounce the family to be a more 
complete unity than the city, and the single person than the family”. (Pol. 
2, 1, 1261a).
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These natural differences among the participants 
of household lead to inequality: they assume, therefore, 
asymmetrical positions in the hierarchy of the familiar 
community. The fact that they are different makes them 
unequal.
The facts about the soul lead us to this conclusion. For there is in 
it by nature that which rules and that which is ruled and we say 
that they have different virtues, i.e. [the virtue] of the part that 
has reason and that of the part without reason. It is clear therefore 
that the same holds true in the case of the others. So that there 
are by nature many cases of ruler and ruled. For in different ways 
the free rules the slave, the male the female, the adult man the 
child. The parts of the soul are present in them all, but present 
differently. For the slave has not got the deliberative part at all; 
the female has it, but it is without mastery, and the child has it, 
but incomplete. (Pol. I, 1260 a 4-14).
Master and slave, or husband and wife, are ἕτεροι 
(dissimilar) and ἀνισοῖ (unequal). Their natural differences 
institute the condition of ruler of the male and free participant 
in the association.
But something diverse happens in Polis, wherein 
citizens are ἕτεροι (different) but ἶσοι (equal). This leads to 
our second question, and helps understanding justice as the 
bound that keeps polis united.
How relevant is it (being ἕτεροι but ἶσοι) to un-
derstand justice as a feature and a task of political 
life? (Question 2)
It is quite simple to keep things in place in household: 
those who are different (heteroi) are ipso facto unequal (anisoi). 
In turn polis should conciliate heterogeneity and equality – 
and the Greeks were aware that this is not a simple task. Both 
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in Ethics and in Politics, Aristotle keeps clear how important 
but difficult it is.
In both treatises, the exploration of this problem 
culminates at the statement of justice as the foundation of 
polis. 
In Politics II 1, 1261a, Aristotle faces the difficulty posed 
by the fact that polis is a hierarchical association, although it 
is composed by equal components. Of course this problem 
there not exists in non-political associations: but how can 
hierarchy works among equal people, as they don’t relate 
each other as superior or inferior? The solution points at the 
very definition of citizen:
Hence reciprocal equality is the preservative of states, as has 
been said before in the Ethics. For even among the free and equal 
this principle must necessarily obtain, since all cannot govern at 
once: they must hold office for a year at a time or by some other 
arrangement or period (…) (Pol. II, 1261a)
(…)
and among peoples where it is impossible because all the citizens 
are equal in their nature, yet at the same time it is only just, whe-
ther governing is a good thing or a bad, that all should partake 
in it, and for equals thus to submit to authority in turn imitates 
their being originally dissimilar; for some govern and others are 
governed by turn, as though becoming other persons; and also 
similarly when they hold office the holders of different offices are 
different persons. (Pol. II, 1261a-b)
From this, we may conclude that being ἕτεροι but ἶσοι 
is directly connected to the task of distributive justice, and 
that this way it remains central to the assurance of polis in 
its proper sense.
On the other hand, being ἕτεροι but ἶσοι is connected to 
the task of commutative justice, as we learn from Nicomachean 
Ethics 1132b:
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But in the interchange of services justice in the form of reciprocity 
is the bond that maintains the association.
The point here is to understand the possibility of 
reciprocity between parts that are dissimilar. This imposes 
proportionality as a main feature of justice, and signalizes it 
as the equilibrium to be always sought in every transaction 
between citizens. 
Commutative justice is thus stated as condition of 
political coexistence, for it is the condition of trade – and 
trade, as we saw, is an essential aspect of polis:
(…) they then are equal, and can form an association together, 
because equality in this sense can be established in their case 
farmer A, food C, shoemaker B, shoemaker’s product equalized 
D; whereas if it were impossible for reciprocal proportion to be 
effected in this way, there could be no association between them. 
(EN V, 5, 1133b)
The dialectical frame of justice as the sign of the 
problematic association among people who are ἕτεροι but 
ἶσοι is also useful to understand this very important account 
of Nicomachean Ethics: the political nature of justice.
As Aristotle states in EN 1134b, justice “exist[s] between 
persons whose relations are naturally regulated by law, that 
is, persons who share equally in ruling and being ruled”. 
Justice between master and slave, husband and wife, or 
father and children, is only akin to the political justice, but 
not the same.
This is connected to Politics Book I. Both here and 
there, Aristotle asks for the link between master and slave, 
father and children, husband and wife, and citizen and 
citizen. Justice is appropriate to label only the last kind of 
relationship, as only this is political. In precise terms, we 
should reserve the term “justice” to the relation between 
equals, hence in the context of polis, wherein it indicates the 
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task to keep equality in spite of diversity of the associates.
Justice has nothing to do with the relation between 
different and unequal, but only between different and equal.
AFTERWORD
Dialectic is probably an infinite path of investigation. 
It looks for clarification from tensioning logoi. Truth appears 
from the inquire of both sides of a problem24, which 
inaugurates a difficulty to face and solve. Through doing 
this, the point gets clearer and clearer.
Let us bring an Aristotelian statement to tension the 
conclusion we offered above.
In Politics IV, 1295b, we read that “surely the ideal of 
the state is to consist as much as possible of persons that 
are equal and alike, and this similarity is most found in the 
middle classes” (βούλεται δέ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων 
ὅτι μάλιστα, τοῦτο δ᾽ ὑπάρχει μάλιστα τοῖς μέσοις.).
This seems to contradict our conclusions: nor against 
Plato, but just like Plato, would Aristotle claim, here, for Polis 
as a homogeneous association and community?
Once again, it is useful to understand the statement 
from its argumentative context.
Book IV is concerned to understand the best political 
regime. But Aristotle’s perspective is not utopic: “best” 
means as good as possible. This varies according to the 
specificities of each polis. One of the most important criteria 
to assess the quality of a constitution is capacity to guarantee 
stability to the polis.
In the chapter 11 of Book IV, he talks about the economic 
condition of the citizens, wondering about which is better: 
having great differences of wealth, or not?
24 This belongs to the very concept of a problem – as it accrues from it structure 
(“is this the definition of X, or not?”). 
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He thinks that being ἕτεροι, at this point, can endanger 
the polis, because too much poor and too much rich people 
behavior in such an inappropriate way that they not fit the 
requirements of a life among equals.
A high degree of economic heterogeneity which turns 
political equality unlikely. In this sense, he clearly states that 
being too much ἕτεροι is not compatible to being ἶσοι. 
Political equality roots on diversity, but there are limits 
to (economic) diversity beyond which (political) equality is 
destroyed.
But this has nothing to do to a conception of Polis as a 
homogeneous community. It just warns his listener (and this 
is a nice advice for our times), that the exaggerated imbalance 
of wealth is not compatible with political coexistence.
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